[Exclusive] 'Oneulhoi', the myth of same-day seafood delivery, ends up in summary bankruptcy... Sandcastles collapsing in the startup 'investment winter'

The operator of 'Oneulhoi', which garnered the full expectations of the venture industry with its innovative 'same-day seafood delivery' service, 'Oneulsiktak', has ultimately put an end to its journey with bankruptcy. This is the result of exposing the true colors of a business model that was engrossed solely in outward growth without generating profits, as the so-called 'startup investment winter' arrived due to the interest rate hikes and liquidity contraction that began in earnest in 2022.

Not only Oneulsiktak, but many promising startups have been unable to withstand the liquidity crisis and have gone bankrupt or been driven to large-scale restructuring, resulting in the venture industry's 'sorting the wheat from the chaff' proceeding more ruthlessly than ever.

■ The rising star of 'ultra-fresh' quick commerce that attracted 22 billion won in lump-sum money

Founded in 2017, Oneulsiktak grew rapidly with a groundbreaking model where customers could receive raw fish on their dinner tables on the same evening if they ordered via mobile by 3 PM. Riding on the explosive response from consumers, it went on a winning streak by attracting cumulative investments of about 22 billion won from major domestic venture capitals (VCs) such as Korea Investment Partners, Hana Ventures, KTB Network (currently Daol Investment), Daesung Private Equity, and Mirae Asset Venture Investment, as well as policy institutions like Korea Growth Investment Corporation.

■ The trap of a 'planned deficit', losses snowballing as sales grew

However, in the process of expanding to a nationwide service based on massive investment funds, its internal stability deteriorated rapidly. According to Pitchdeck data, Oneulsiktak grew its size by recording sales of 2.1 billion won (operating loss of 2.1 billion won) in 2019, 13.1 billion won (operating loss of 3.9 billion won) in 2020, and 17.2 billion won (operating loss of 12.6 billion won) in 2021, but its deficit margin also increased exponentially. It recorded sales of 17.2 billion won in 2022 as well, but the operating loss ballooned to a whopping 18.7 billion won. In fact, as of 2022, Oneulsiktak's current liabilities amounted to 18.8 billion won, while its current assets were merely 12.82 million won, and its total equity also fell into a severe state of 'complete capital impairment' at a scale of minus (-) 18.3 billion won.

■ A series of C-level executive resignations and a 5.2 billion won default

The prelude to the tragedy was first detected internally. As financial difficulties surfaced around mid-2022, key executives in the so-called 'C-level', including the Chief Operating Officer (COO), who was a logistics expert, and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), left the company one after another.

Ultimately, Oneulsiktak, which relied entirely on external blood transfusions, failed to attract large-scale additional investments and faced a default situation where it could not settle billions of won (lawsuit scale of about 5.2 billion won) in payments to partner companies, such as seafood suppliers. It carried out a large-scale recommended resignation of all employees, and the service was virtually suspended in September 2022. To make matters worse, as financial uncertainty reached its peak, it even received a 'disclaimer of opinion' from Hyundai Accounting Corporation, which was in charge of the audit, citing going concern uncertainty. Consequently, sales in 2023 plummeted to the level of 20 million won (0.02 billion won).

Unable to recover in the end, Oneulsiktak Co., Ltd. made a bitter exit after receiving a 'summary bankruptcy' declaration from the 13th Division of the Seoul Bankruptcy Court on February 23, 2026. Summary bankruptcy is a simplified bankruptcy procedure applied when the size of the debtor's remaining assets is remarkably small at less than 500 million won.

■ 'Too big to fail' is a thing of the past... Startups falling in the investment winter

The downfall of Oneulsiktak goes beyond the problem of a single company and symbolizes the crisis across the platform industry where the liquidity party has ended. This is because platform companies, which received corporate valuations solely through mediation without producing goods, had relied too heavily on a model that only increased transaction volume without immediate surplus, making them inevitably the first to take a hit when institutional investors' wallets close. Indeed, with the arrival of the 'investment ice age' starting in 2022, companies that had attempted unreasonable expansion were hit hard one after another. 'Balaan', which recently received a bankruptcy declaration, was also a representative company that took a direct hit from the investment winter.

■ From growth to 'profitability'... A 'Squid Game' leaving a painful lesson

For nearly the past 10 years, the startup industry enjoyed a boom period where billions and tens of billions of won in funds flocked in simply by showing vision and growth speed. Companies that had been engrossed solely in increasing their size by imitating the so-called Coupang-style 'planned deficit' strategy laid bare the weakness of being the first to be eliminated the moment funding dried up.

The bankruptcy of Oneulsiktak and the restructuring of multiple platform companies are throwing a painful lesson to the startup industry. The assessment is that the era of outward expansion relying solely on investment funds without a clear business model (BM) is over, and now 'internal stability' capable of independently generating a surplus has become the only formula for survival.